168 Ariz. 261, 812 P.2d 1079)
The STATE of Arizona and Jane Does I, II, and III, Petitioners,
The Honorable Nanette WARNER, a Judge and the Honorable Howard Hantman, a
Pro Tempore for the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, County of Pima,
Scott Kammerer, Terry Andrew Pierce, and Ricky Lee Nelson, Real Parties in
Nos. 2 CA‑SA 90‑0190, 2 CA‑SA 90‑0187 and 2 CA‑SA 90‑0192.
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2, Department A.
Dec. 21, 1990.
Review Denied July 10, 1991.
LIVERMORE, Presiding Judge.
On November 6, 1990, a majority of the voters of the State of Arizona
approved Proposition 104, an initiative measure to amend article 2 of the
state constitution by adding § 2.1, popularly known as the Victims' Bill of
Rights. The amendment was proclaimed law by the governor on November 27.
As relevant to this litigation, § 2.1 provides:
SECTION 2.1 (A) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due
process, a victim of crime has a right:
5. To refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by the
defendant, the defendant's attorney, or other person acting on behalf of the
The issue presented by these consolidated special actions is the
applicability of the quoted constitutional amendment to criminal cases
pending on November 27, 1990. Because the issue is one of first impression,
involves only questions of law and is of statewide importance to the
criminal justice system, we accept jurisdiction. See University of Arizona
Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294
(1983). For the reasons stated below, we grant the state's requested
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
1. State v. Nelson
Nelson is charged with five counts of sexual conduct with a minor under
15. By letters dated September 25 and October 16 to the county attorney,
defense counsel requested that arrangements be made for witness and victim
interviews. The county attorney responded on October 30, identifying the
witnesses he intended to call, including the victim, [FN1] and requesting
counsel to notify him of "some times that you might be available to
FN1. Because the real parties in interest have not been convicted of the
crimes with which they have been charged, the complainants are as yet only
alleged to have been victims. For ease of reference, however, and with no
comment on the merits of the charges, we will refer to these individuals as
**1081 *263 On November 27, defense counsel filed a motion to compel an
interview with the victim. At the hearing on the motion, counsel advised
the court that he had spoken with a paralegal employed by the county
attorney who was responsible for setting up interviews and who had advised
him that "[t]he way she saw it was that whether [Proposition 104] passed or
not was not going to affect cases that were in existence before the
election." The victim did not appear at the hearing; however, the state
invoked her rights under the amendment. The trial court granted the motion
on the grounds that requests for interviews were made prior to the effective
date of Proposition 104 and that "defense counsel relied on the fact that an
interview would proceed irrespective of Proposition 104."
2. State v. Pierce
Pierce is charged with burglary, kidnapping and seven counts of sexual
assault. Again, efforts were made to obtain interviews with the victim
prior to the election on November 6, and counsel avows that he did not seek
an order to compel an interview on the basis of the same paralegal's
representations that she was attempting to arrange the interviews. However,
on November 14, the paralegal advised counsel that the victim was invoking
her right not to be interviewed under Proposition 104. The next day,
counsel filed a motion to compel, and on November 20, the trial court
ordered that the interview be completed by 5 p.m. on November 28.
3. State v. Kammerer
Kammerer is charged with kidnapping, sexual assault and public sexual
indecency. Unsuccessful efforts were made to arrange an interview of the
victim, and on November 20 a motion to compel was filed. The victim
appeared at the November 29 hearing and invoked her right not to be
interviewed. Nonetheless, the trial court granted the motion "[b]ecause
major efforts were made on the part of defense counsel to set an interview
and motions were filed prior to the effective date of Proposition 104."
The state sought special action relief from these three orders, and the
cases were consolidated for argument before this court. The victims in all
three cases have joined in the state's request for relief.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The state argues in essence that the rights conferred upon victims of crime
by the constitutional amendment contained in Proposition 104 became
effective upon the November 27 proclamation by the governor. See Ariz.
Const. art. 4, pt. 1 § 1(5). Accordingly, the trial court had no authority
to force these victims to waive their right not to be interviewed after that
 The real parties in interest present several arguments in opposition.
Pierce argues first that, because the order compelling the interview in his
case was entered prior to the effective date of the amendment, it was a
lawful and valid order with which the victim must comply. That order was,
however, based on the discovery rules in effect prior to the constitutional
amendment. See generally Ariz.R.Crim.P. 15, 17 A.R.S. Those rules have now
been abrogated as respects victim interviews. The order required that the
victim be interviewed by 5 p.m. on November 28. In the interim, the
amendment became effective to deprive the trial court of the power to
require the interview. Accordingly, although the order may have been valid
when entered, the legal basis for the order was supplanted and no longer
 Pierce and Nelson contend that there is no evidence in the record that
the victims have asserted a right not to be interviewed. Thus, they argue,
the petition for special action in their cases is not properly before this
court. We disagree. Rule 39(c)(2) of the criminal rules specifically
confers upon the prosecutor standing to assert "any of the rights to which
the victim is entitled by this rule or by any other provision of law." Such
was done in each case. Moreover, as noted above, the victims have joined in
the state's petitions before this court.
**1082 *264 Kammerer argues that the victim in his case never declined to
be interviewed prior to the effective date of the amendment and has
therefore waived the right to decline. We see no logic to this argument.
Prior to November 27, the victim had no constitutional right which she could
waive. Moreover, nothing in either Rule 15 or the amendment prevents a
victim from initially agreeing to talk but subsequently refusing to do so.
 The real parties in interest argue that to apply the amendment to these
cases would be to give it retroactive effect, contrary to A.R.S. § 1‑244. No
issue of retroactivity is presented here as to the victims. The victims do
not seek to invoke the amendment to support a refusal to be interviewed
asserted prior to the effective date of the amendment; they assert the
right presently, to preclude any interview after the effective date.
 In essence, the real parties in interest are challenging the
present application of the amendment to preclude the assertion of their
right to discovery under the rules of criminal procedure. Although the
general rule is that legislation will have prospective application only, the
rule is otherwise where the legislation is merely procedural in nature and
does not affect substantive rights. Stuart v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 152 Ariz. 78, 730 P.2d 255 (App.1986); Allen v. Fisher, 118 Ariz.
95, 574 P.2d 1314 (App.1978).
Uniformly, the substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights; whereas the adjective, remedial or procedural
law is that which prescribes the method of enforcing the right or obtaining
redress for its invasion.
State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109, 110, 392 P.2d 775, 776 (1964). Our
courts have consistently held that a criminal defendant has no vested or
substantive right to a particular mode of procedure. State v. Staatz, 159
Ariz. 411, 768 P.2d 143 (1988); State v. Leonard, 151 Ariz. 1, 725 P.2d 493
(App.1986). Staatz involved an amendment to Rule 18.5 pertaining to the
exercise of peremptory challenges to jurors. The court held:
The alternating strike rule does not create, define, or regulate a right.
It simply specifies the means by which defendant's right to exercise
peremptory challenges is implemented. The challenged rule is procedural,
and the defendant was not deprived of any substantive right by enforcement
of the amended rule.
159 Ariz. at 416, 768 P.2d at 148. In this case, the substantive right
involved is the right to confront and cross‑examine the witnesses against the
real parties in interest, that is, the victims. The amendment does not affect
that right, which can be fully exercised at trial; rather, if invoked, it
deprives the real parties in interest of a method of discovery. In our view,
the right to interview or depose a victim under Rule 15 is clearly procedural
in nature, and the application of the amendment does not impair any
substantive or vested rights of the real parties in interest.
 Finally, the real parties in interest argue that the state's conduct in
each case has denied them a due process right to be treated with fundamental
fairness. They appear to contend that the state was obligated to inform
defense counsel that the enactment of the amendment would affect their
clients' right to interview the victims. No authority is cited for this
proposition, and we find no merit to it. From all that appears in the record,
the state did no more than proceed in accordance with the then‑applicable
rules to disclose the names of witnesses and respond to requests for
interviews. It was not incumbent upon the state to ensure that interviews
sought by the real parties in interest were conducted prior to the effective
date of the amendment. Moreover, while the state has standing to assert a
victim's rights, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 39(c)(2), 17 A.R.S., it has no authority to
waive those rights. Thus, the real parties in interest had no right to rely
on any representations that may have been made by employees of the county
attorney's office as to the effect of the amendment on their cases.
**1083 *265 The real parties in interest have no federal constitutional right
to discovery, Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30
(1977), nor did such a right exist under the Arizona Constitution. Because
the Arizona criminal discovery rules were unique in the United States, the
effect of the 1990 amendment is to place these defendants in the same position
as every other criminal defendant both here and in other jurisdictions. We
fail to see how this deprives the real parties in interest of due process or
the right to fundamentally fair proceedings against them.
The orders of the respondent judges are vacated, and the causes are remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HATHAWAY and LACAGNINA, JJ., concur.
END OF DOCUMENT